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Abstract: 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have been part of companies’ strategies to improve their 
profitability and market valuation. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
R&D expenditures on the acquirer’s profitability and stock market valuation in two 
different cases: when the acquiring firm is a technological company and a non-
technological company. The target company for both is a technological company. Firstly, 
it is hypothesized that R&Ds of the acquirer enhance the stock market valuation more 
for technology acquirers than for non-technological counterparts. The comparison of 
stock market valuations is performed in the year when the company acquires a 
technological company. Secondly, this study shows how technological and non-
technology acquirers can convert R&D spending into future profitability within one year 
after the M&A being completed. 
 
The sample consist of 186 technological M&As and 50 M&As where the acquirer is a 
non-technological company. The chosen acquirers are Nasdaq listed companies which 
completed a merger or acquisition between 2010 and 2017. The methodology used is 
OLS regression analysis. 
 
The key findings of the study reflect that in the year when the M&A is completed there 
is no correlation of R&D expenditures with stock price when a technological or a non-
technological company acquires a technological company. The other important finding 
is that in the long run a technological company can convert R&D spending into future 
profitability more efficiently than a non-technological company by acquiring a 
technological company. Technological M&As have more potential to realize synergies 
after the M&A. During the year of the M&A R&D spending increase in both companies, 
which means that during the year of acquisition companies cannot utilize the synergies 
created from the acquisition of the technological company.  
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Mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) are one option for firms to enhance their 
profitability and market value (e.g., Hitt et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2006). According to 
McSweeney (2012) it is very costly for companies to develop new products in a 
sustainable way when product life cycle is shortening, customers have more different 
needs and technical knowledge specialization increases. Mergers and acquisitions also 
provide a possibility to takeover a company and provide a substitute product. In 
addition, M&As also provide companies an opportunity to access a firm’s technological 
knowledge or innovative capability instead of investing in research and development 
(hereafter R&D) themselves to improve technological performance. Acquisitions 
generally refer to deals, where an acquirer buys more than 50 % of the target company’s 
shares (e.g., Ahern & Weston, 2007). In M&A a new company is formed by two merging 
companies where ownership is broadly equal (Weston & Copeland, 1992). 
 
M&As also might be used to prevent a competitor getting access to technological 
knowledge or for making R&D local in some specific markets. M&As can be a part of the 
firm’s competitive and external growth strategy (Erez-Rein et al., 2004). Studies tend to 
focus on the business performance of M&As, usually after the process is completed. 
There are a lot of factors related to M&A that need to be resolved to make a new entity 
successful. M&As are part of normal corporate events but very volatile and they can 
create value-added organizational synergies or turn out to be value-destroying disasters 
(Brousseau, Driver, Larsson & Sweet, 2004).  
 
 
1.1 Topicality of the study 
Technological M&As are one solution to respond to the demands for innovation and 
increasing competition in the technology industry. R&D spending has increased over the 
past ten years in the U.S., which makes R&D a more remarkable expenditure and a more 
topical subject to study (Ranft et al., 2012; Makri et al., 2010). In technological mergers 
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synergies are usually associated with the knowledge in the firm and the managers role 
is emphasized in the process. 
 
This study examines how research and development expenditures affect an acquirer’s 
stock market value and profitability after M&A between technology and non-technology 
companies. This study focuses on publicly listed U.S. acquirers on NASDAQ from 2010 to 
2017. The reason to study M&A in Nasdaq is that in the United States of America R&D 
expenditures were the highest in the world in 2016 (see table 1). The amount of R&D 
spending has increased every year from 2010 to 2017 (OECD, 2021) which also means 
that the number of technology M&As continues to grow. This provides new information 




 Table 1. 
 
 
Top 10 countries with the highest R&D expenditure in 2016 (in PPP, dollars) 
 
Country R&D spending in dollars (billion) 
1. USA 476,5 
2. China 360,7 
3. Japan 170,5 
4. Germany 109,8 
5. South Korea 72,3 
6. France 60,8 
7. India 48,1 
8. United Kingdom 44,2 
9. Brazil 42,1 
10. Russia 39,8 




Figure 1 shows all M&As in numbers and the whole value in the U.S. during 2007–2017. 
The blue columns represent the number of transactions in each year. The orange line 
represents the overall value of M&A in each year. Mergers and acquisitions intensity 
follows economic upswings and economic downturns. Earlier merger waves have 
occurred in early 1900s, in 1920s, in 1960s, in 1980s, in 1990s and 2000. Since 1990s 
M&A started to be global. 2010 is considered to be the year when the most current 
(seventh) wave of mergers and acquisition started (e.g., Junni & Teerikangas, 2019). In 
2008 and 2009 there has been a decline in mergers and acquisitions both in value and 
in volume due to the financial crisis in 2008 which was considered a very severe crisis 
globally. From 2010 to 2013 the amount of the M&A didn’t change, but after that there 
has been quite a strong increase as figure 1 shows. The examined M&As occurred during 
the seventh wave. 
 
Typical for the seventh wave is the focus on global growth, acquirers from emerging 
markets play a very important role, disruptive innovations that change industry 
landscape and industry boundaries. This has changed acquisitions where firms seek 
target companies from start-ups and consider complementary or adjacent businesses. 
Revenue and growth still play a fundamental role in M&A (EY, 2018). According to 
Deloitte’s study (2018) technology acquisition is the number one driver of M&A pursuits 
in the year 2018 and managers are showing a strong favouritism towards vertical 
integration, especially in life sciences, health care, technology, and financial services. 
The highest value of M&A was in the U.S. in the year 2015. The amount of money 
involved in M&As is huge as figure 1 shows and the number of mergers and acquisitions 










Figure 1. Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States 
 
 
Number of mergers and acquisitions in United States between 2007 and 2017 (The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions 
and Alliances (IMAA), 2021).  
 
This study includes four sections after introduction. The second part is devoted to 
relevant literature, key concepts, and hypotheses development. The third part describes 
the data which is used in empirical research, data definition and models used in this 
study. The fourth part introduces results of the study, findings, and a robustness test. 
The last section concludes with a summary of findings and conclusions. 
 
 
1.2. Research problem and the purpose of this study 
The technology industry has achieved a strong position in the economy compared to 
other industries. Technological achievements, job growth creation and contribution to 
efficiency gains has been remarkable during many decades which has led to technology 
companies being part of M&As as acquirer companies or target companies.  Acquirers 
seek growth potential through acquisitions in high-technology industries from 




































































































shareholder benefits for acquiring companies which target companies in other lower 
growth industries can’t. On the other hand, technology target value is uncertain due to 
the fact that the development of products in unproven and uncharted field (Kohers & 
Kohers, 2000). That is why the analysis of specific features of firms involved in M&As is 
a very interesting topic to study. Data of technology M&As is widely used and many 
parties focus on technology M&As. In addition to companies and researchers in the field, 
investors, analysts and financial institutions also pay attention to technology M&As.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if acquiring firms can enhance their current 
market value and future profitability through a technological M&A. Levin et al. (1988) 
conclude in their study that technological growth is the primary source of economic 
growth. The topic is under researched and therefore it is important to study technology 
M&As and get more empirical evidence about them.  
 
When examining technological companies, research and development expenditures 
play a very important role in creating value for the firm (Guo et al., 2006; Johnson & 
Pazderka, 1993). R&D spending’s impact on a firm’s market value and profitability has 
been a subject of attention in many studies. As a result, these studies indicate that R&D 
expenditures have a positive influence on a firm’s market value and profitability (e.g., 
Booth & al., 2006; Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Chan et al., 2001). This has inspired 
research to study what kind of relationship there is between R&D expenditures and the 
results of mergers and acquisitions. Guo et al. (2006) state that information regarding 
R&D plays an important role for investors when they make investment decisions 
internationally and for managers, because R&D expenditures may have a positive effect 
on a firm’s long-term performance. Studying technological M&As makes it possible to 
directly measure the acquirer’s financial performance related to R&D (Higgins & 
Rodriguez, 2005). 
 
Some authors consider acquisition as an investment decision (e.g., Hodgkinson & 
Partington, 2007; Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008). A newly formed firm after acquisition 
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should be more profitable and valuable than two firms in case they were not merged. 
This is also called synergy theory.  There are many industries where innovation is an 
important part of firm’s value creation. Mergers and acquisitions are considered as a 
strategic option to remain competitive by acquiring new knowledge and capabilities 
(Makri et al., 2010; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Especially in technological industries M&As 
play an important part of strategy to enhance the company’s resources and capabilities 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; King et al., 2008). Investments in R&D further help create 
technological resources. R&D is a strategic firm-specific expenditure that can be 
accumulated over a period of time by consistent strategy policy (Dierickx & Cool 1989). 
 
The post-merger innovation performance is affected by the synergy of knowledge of the 
acquirer and target firms. An important predictor of post-merger innovation 
performance is the knowledge relatedness of the acquirer and target firm (Cloodt et al., 
2006; Hagedoorn & Dyusters 2002; Ahuja & Katila 2001). In previous research there have 
been differences in results regarding how many of the M&As are unsuccessful. 
According to Calipha, Tarba and Brock (2010) more than 50% of M&As fail. Bower (2001) 
states that most of the M&As will fail. He mentioned that for R&D-orientated acquirers 
it is challenging to hold on to the key people from the target firm after M&A and for 
people from the acquirer to adapt to the new situation. Post-merger-period is very 
critical from the acquirer point of view. Cassiman et al. (2005) stated in their literature 
review that M&As have a positive impact on R&D when the purpose of a M&A is to 
source technology for the firms. In this case the integration process is efficiently 
managed during the process and key people are retained after a M&A. Acquirers are 
able to realize synergies better when combining know-how in M&As if the acquirers 
have a strong internal knowledge base of their own and can evaluate potential target 
companies.  
 
According to previous results M&As don’t increase effectiveness (Makri et al., 2010) if 
merging entities are technologically too related (this also includes knowledge-
relatedness). When two entities are technologically complementary, but not similar or 
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substitutive, M&A increases the effectiveness of R&D. Acquired external knowhow 
increases innovation performance only when the acquirer is engaged at the same time 
in internal R&D activities. The firm’s own internal R&D activities are then 
complementary with external technology acquisitions (Cassiman et al., 2005). 
 
The research problem will be studied with the help of testing four hypotheses further 
developing the study of Kallunki et al. (2009). Firstly, this study looks at if M&As can have 
a positive influence on the relationship between R&D in technology M&As and the firm’s 
stock market value when the acquirer is a technology firm or non-technology firm. 
Secondly, this study shows that R&D expenditures are also reflected positively in the 
future profitability of a technology acquirer, but not in the future profitability of a non-
technology acquirer.  
 
 
1.3 Research hypotheses  
1.3.1 Acquisitions effect on stock market valuation 
As R&D expenditures influence firm’s stock market value it is reasonable firstly to 
perform an analysis regarding if there is any difference in firm’s stock market value when 
a technology firm acquires a technology firm and when a technology firm acquires a 
non-technology firm. Developing further the research ideas from Kallunki et al. (2009) 
there are two hypotheses related to a firm’s stock market valuation which are tested in 
this study: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1a: Acquisitions of technology firms enhance the current market 
valuation of the R&D spending of the acquiring technology firm. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Acquisitions of technology firms do not enhance the current 






1.3.2 Acquisitions effect on future profitability of a firm 
Secondly, it is reasonable to evaluate stock market prices that reflects a firm’s future 
profitability. In line with Kallunki et al. (2009) it is assumed that stock market prices and 
the acquirer’s profitability should be enhanced when a technology firm acquires a 
technology firm and decrease when a technology firm acquires a non-technology firm.  
 
Ahuja & Katila (2001) found that acquisitions can improve the technological 
performance of the acquirer. That means it is not enough to study stock price reactions, 
but also the future financial performance. Healy et al. (1992) studied large mergers and 
found that merged firms have significant improvements in asset productivity relative to 
their industries after the merger, leading to higher post-merger operating cash flow 
returns. They did not find a decrease in capital expenditure or R&D spending of the 
acquirer which both are long term investments. A positive strong relation between post-
merger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns in connection with 
merger announcements indicate a high expectation of financial performance of the 
newly merged firm.  
 
Al-Sharkas et al. (2008) reported that bank mergers increased cost and profit efficiency. 
Mergers had a positive effect on technological improvement compared to non-merged 
banks which allowed them to take more advantage of technological opportunities.  
Following Kallunki et al. (2009) who state that it is relevant also to study how 
technological and non-technological M&As affect future profitability in addition to stock 
market valuation, in this study the following hypotheses are introduced: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Acquisitions of technology firms enhance the association between 




HYPOTHESIS 2b: Acquisitions of technology firms do not enhance the association 
between a non-technology acquirer’s R&D spending and its future profitability 
 
 
1.4 Methodology of the study 
The research approach is empirical. The data used in this study is examined using 
statistical analysis. The chosen statistical analysis for research design is regression 
analysis. The purpose of the regression analysis is to investigate the relationship 
between variables which can be positive or negative or there can be no relationship 
between variables. Variables are divided in dependent (referred as Y) and independent 
(referred as X) variables.  A simple linear regression model studies the correlation 
between two variables: dependent (Y) and independent (X). The independent variable 
can be called as explanatory variable. A multiple linear regression model uses multiple 
correlations between the dependent (Y) and two or more independent (Xs) variables 
(Martin & Bridgmon, 2012). 
 
For this study it is relevant to choose more than one independent variable to analyze 
what could affect stock market valuation and the profitability of the acquirer. Therefore, 
the chosen model is the linear regression model. 
  
Certain requirements must be met to form an applicable model. The first requirement 
to use the regression model is that the values dependent variable’s values should be 
random, and the importance of the explanatory variable should be fixed or random. 
Secondly, a correlation between variables should exist and between them a linear 
dependence can be observed (Tähtinen et al., 2020). For explanatory variables (X) it is 
better in the model that they don’t correlate too much with each other.  In case variables 
correlate strongly with each other the result is multicollinearity and variables do not 
create new information. The last requirement is that the dependent variable is normally 




2. Theoretical background of the study 
There are multiple theories explaining the motives behind M&As. M&As are usually 
conducted for financial, strategic, and managerial motives (Faulkner et al., 2012, pp. 
686–696). Several studies that examined technological M&As have focused on financial 
motives such as innovation performance, market value creation and profitability after 
the M&A (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Hitt et al 1991; Kallunki et al., 2009). Weitzel (2011) 
has categorized different M&A theories in two groups, value increasing and value 
destroying theories. One value increasing theory, synergy theory (also called efficiency 
theory), is observed closer in this chapter. The reason to focus on synergy theory is that 
it suggests the purpose of the M&A is to bring gains for the owners through operative 
synergies. McSweeney (2012) consider that the key assets of R&D capabilities are the 
R&D people of the company weather the company is large or small. Hostile takeovers 
are not common in these kinds of M&As because it is in the interest of the acquirers to 
keep the key R&D people during the M&A process. For the acquirers it is more profitable 
to use M&As as a tool to acquire technology targets and to create operative synergies. 
Aggressive bids would be considered counterproductive.  
 
Generally, value increasing theories highlight that a merger occurs because they 
generate synergies that help to get more value for both the acquirer and target. 
Technology target companies make it possible to study whether the synergies between 
technology and non-technology acquirers occur. In an ideal situation the M&A is 
profitable as a firm’s basic idea is to create value for its shareholders (Hitt et al., 2001).  
 
Weitzel (2011) also introduced two other value increasing theories: market power 
theory and corporate control theory. Market power theory in short suggests that 
companies with high market power can control the price at which it sells a product or 
service to increase economic profit and earn greater margins through the appropriation 
of consumer surplus. According to Chatterjee (1986) market power theory and synergy 
theory had to be distinguished because they have a different approach to value creating 
in M&As. According to corporate control theory underperforming companies are taken 
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over by more efficient companies. This is also related to efficiency theory partially, but 
it doesn’t assume that synergies exist between the target and the acquirer company. 
Unlike in synergy theory, in corporate control theory it is typical that the target’s 
management is very reluctant regarding any takeover attempts. 
 
 
2.1 Synergy theory 
According to Chatterjee (1986) the general purpose of acquisitions is to create economic 
value by reducing costs and/or charge higher prices. When a firm is efficient it can sell 
products more cost-efficiently than rivals and rivals will suffer from that. Chatterjee 
(1986) highlights efficiency to make M&As successful. M&As enable the merged firms to 
produce products at lower prices. When products are produced cost-efficiently, demand 
for factor inputs decreases. Compared to competitors, final prices at the market are 
lower and manufacturing costs are higher. This is also called economies of scale: revenue 
can be created with less costs. When firms acquire technological targets they especially 
target operative synergies through M&As. 
 
Bradley et al. (1988) defined synergistic gain in acquisitions as the sum of change in 
wealth for the stockholders of the acquirer and target firm.  The wealth in acquisition is 
created when the resources of the buyer and seller are greater than the value of the 
separate entities. Of course, management of the acquirer has a very important impact 
on how the value is generated after acquisition. Synergized motivations behind an 
acquisition should create wealth for the new entity. If managers overestimate the value 
of acquisition and pay more than the synergy is worth, the acquisition is partly or purely 
hubris (Hodgkinson & Partington, 2007). 
 
M&As drive firms to merge by creating a more profitable and more valuable business.  
M&As are one option to achieve a quick access to resources of the target firm that are 
transferred and allocated to the acquirer. By gaining control over the target firm the 
new entity can exploit some specialized resources and implement a new operating 
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strategy. The new strategy in corporate synergy can involve more efficient management, 
economies of scale or scope, improvement of production techniques, the combination 
of complementary resources, increased market power, the redeployment of assets to 
more profitable uses, or any number of value-creating mechanisms (Bradley et al., 
1983).  
 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) studied how multiple elements effect synergy realization, 
such as economics, finance, strategy, organizational theory, and human resource 
management in one robust process-oriented model. They found that strategic 
similarities and complementary operations (also included R&D) in M&A increase synergy 
realization. According to them, similarities in the management style of the merging 
companies also reduce employee reluctance during the combination phase.  
 
M&As effect on stock market value has been a very popular topic among previous 
studies to find out how markets react to the possible synergies created in M&A. 
Hackbarth and Morellac (2008) analyzed stock behavior of two publicly listed companies 
after the M&A announcement. The authors emphasize that acquisitions have two main 
characters. Acquisitions are always more or less risky, and decisions are partly or 
completely irreversible. A more inefficient firm sells its assets to a more efficient firm 
and after that a merged entity can make investments in new assets or divest some 
acquired assets. This is called economies of scope. The acquirer increases the efficiency 
of the combined firm. They found that beta does not have significant impact on stock 
market price before takeover and after the M&A announcement beta drops moderately. 
Generally, they found that the M&A announcement has an abnormally positive effect 
on the target’s stock return, while the effect is negative for the acquirer.  
 
According to Lev and Sougiannis (1996) R&D spending is strongly related with 
subsequent stock prices and returns. R&D spending is value-relevant information for 
shareholders. They did not find direct effect of R&D spending on the current stock price. 
It might be due to mispricing of the shares or that the subsequent surplus returns are 
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compensating for an extra-market risk factor related with R&D. Their finding might 
indicate that investors react very carefully to R&D spending of the company, or that the 
investors don’t pay attention early enough to the R&D spending. 
 
 
2.2 Technological mergers and acquisitions: overview 
Technological M&As are one solution to respond to the demands for innovation and 
increasing competition in the technology industry. R&D spending has increased over the 
past ten years in the U.S., which makes R&D a more remarkable expenditure and a more 
topical subject to study (Ranft et al., 2012; Makri et al., 2010). In technological mergers 
synergies are usually associated with the knowledge in the firm and the managers role 
is emphasized in the process. Knowledge is an important competitive tool and M&As 
seem to be a prominent strategy to acquire new knowledge (Makri et al., 2010). Trading 
the knowledge and cooperating in R&D with other firms are part of firms´ innovation 
strategies. The successful innovation is dependent on integration and the new 
knowledge of the innovation process (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). Innovation brings 
something new into-use and the criteria for success of innovation is commercial. 
Invention brings something new into being and the criteria for success of invention is 
technical (Rogers, 1962; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986). 
 
Ensign et al. (2014) studied the impact of dimensions of proximity (geographic, 
cognitive, and organizational) on knowledge transfer after M&A. They found 
technological M&As were linked by geographic, cognitive, and organizational factors as 
well as knowledge transfer and innovation. Cognitive proximity includes base 
knowledge. Firms with the same base knowledge transferred knowledge and 
communicated more successfully than firms with different base knowledge. Also, Erez-
Rein et al. (2004) highlighted in their case-study big differences between the results of 
merging or acquired companies and potential less successful outcomes because of the 
increased risk of conflict. Thus, gaps don’t automatically determine the outcome of 
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M&As. The motive behind M&As is always to create a new entity. Managers need to be 
active in analyzing the gaps and act to reduce them to achieve a positive outcome. 
 
After a M&A there should be knowledge transfer between the acquirer and the target 
so that operative synergies are achieved. There may be some processes that don’t 
progress knowledge transfer. For example, fast rotation of key managers with their 
knowledge limits knowledge transfer (Cannella & Hambrick 1993). Knowledge transfer 
creates value when new products and processes are identified and implemented to 
create competitive advantages for the acquirer. This depends a lot on how the 
organization can share and leverage information, resources and expertise, or so-called 
knowledge assets (Haspeslagh & Jenison 1991; Inkpen 2000). 
 
One significant motivation behind technological M&As is to speed up the process of 
getting products to a market and enhance the firm’s competitiveness where managers 
play an important role. Most efficient managers can combine many factors of M&As 
including completion, realization of planned synergies and discovery of new synergies. 
Two forms of change exploitation and exploration are both necessary for organizations 
to survive in dynamic markets (Graebner, 2004). The integration process is very 
challenging and there are many ways not to succeed. Acquisitions are also an important 
way to get valuable resources and to renew the firm’s strategy (Graebner et al., 2010). 
Acquisition of new technologies is a necessary means by which established firms add to 
their technical capabilities and products, enhance their market power, and achieve 
strategic renewal (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). A firm can develop knowledge base through investments or by 
acquiring external knowledge through acquisitions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Huber, 
1991). 
 
Technology companies have fewer tangible assets by nature. They are future oriented 
which makes their results dependent on untested technologies and prospects are 
unpredictable. The benefits of R&D spending will materialize in the long term, and at the 
same time the life cycle of the products might be short (Chan et al 2001). In a fast-
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changing technology area firms seek collaboration through M&A (Kallunki et al., 2009). 
M&As offer a possibility to redefine R&D processes for the merging firms. R&D 
expenditure of the target is also an important source of technological change (Bertrand 
& Zuniga, 2004). 
 
According to Makri et al. (2010) complementary scientific and technological knowledge 
contribute positively to the post-merger performance. Ahuja & Katila (2001) studied 
firms in the chemical industry. They emphasize in their study that highly related or 
unrelated knowledge in acquisitions reduces post acquisition innovation output 
compared to a moderate level of related knowledge. The larger the absolute size of the 
acquired knowledge is, the better the post-acquisition performance and innovation 
outputs are. For the non-technological acquisitions, they didn’t find any significant 
innovation output. It is necessary to evaluate what kind of knowledge-based acquisition 
has been done and what the value of R&D spending is. Cloodt et al. (2006) studied post-
M&A innovative performance of acquiring firms in the high-technology sector. They 
used patent data to measure innovative performance. As a result, in their study to 
maximize innovation performance, companies should target M&A targets that are 
neither too unrelated nor too similar in terms of their knowledge base. In this study the 
focus is also on non-technological acquirers that acquire a technology target. For them 
technological knowledge is newer than for the technology acquirers, which presents a 
challenge.  
 
According to Hitt et al. (2012) M&As increase the profitability of the new entity, when 
the acquirer and target firm can enhance their innovation (amount and novelty). 
Scientific and technological knowledge enhance innovation performance most when 
they are similar enough, but both companies still learn business from each other. For 
example, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) contributed by studying market value effect of 
acquisitions involving internet firms. As a result, stock market return was positive when 
a firm used acquisitions to adapt to the introduction of a new major technology. They 
also found that acquisitions brought more value to the acquirer than alliances. 
20 
 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) also concluded that when the acquirer improves 
technological skills and learning capabilities through acquisitions it has a positive effect 
on technological performance.  
 
Hagerdoorn and Duysters (2000) highlight the importance of organizational and 
strategic fit in M&As of research-intensive firms. They found that when the acquirer can 
improve technological skills and learning capabilities through acquisitions it has a 
positive effect on technological performance. This is a long-term consequence. When 
studying M&As’ effect on firms’ performance the results are not seen immediately and 
it is individual how quickly the acquirer can benefit after the M&A. The risks of M&As 
are reduced when firms are operating in similar sectors or have some similarity in 
product-markets. 
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) found in their study on pharmaceutical firms that R&D 
activities of a target firm have a positive impact on the acquirer’s returns and overall 
results when the acquirer is able to get information before the acquisition or has a 
superior negotiation position. Also, if the acquirer and the target firms are similar as 
regards research, an acquirer should be able to place a more accurate value on the 
target firm and that way create more value for shareholders. Firms experienced some 
deterioration on research or sales related to acquisition, but afterwards they were able 
to stabilize or reverse it.  
 
According to Nguyen et al. (2012) it is difficult to get a clear picture of the motives of 
mergers and acquisitions because they involve multiple motives which may be at the 
same time both value increasing and value decreasing. For example, Bradley et al. (1983) 
state that the motivation behind value-increasing acquisitions is to benefit from 
synergies by combining the resources of two firms. Value creation in acquisitions can be 
due to more efficient management, economics of scale, improved production 
techniques, combination of complementary resources, use of assets in a more profitable 




So far this study has introduced value increasing theories of M&A, but value decreasing 
theories also exist which entails a value decrease for the shareholders. Weitzel also 
introduced different value decreasing theories i.e., theory of managerial hubris, theory 
of managerial discretion, theory of managerial entrenchment and theory of empire-
building. Managerial hubris suggests that over-confident managers end up paying too 
much for the target firm because managers of the acquirer suffer from bounded 
rationality. Jensen (1986) introduced theory of managerial discretion. According to this 
theory managers end up paying too much for the target firm but not because of 
managers overconfidence but rather because of an excess of free cash flow. Managers 
are likely to do fast investment decisions that lead to unprofitable results for the 
shareholders. Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) stated when observing M&As that they 
continue to be a common and even popular option for corporate development. 
According to their study there is a little change in the failure rate over the same time 
period in M&A. One big reason is that managers are driven in takeovers by non-
maximizing motives instead of their own self-interest.  
 
Higgings and Rodriguez (2006) state that the three major reasons behind failed 
acquisitions are overbidding for the target firm, selecting the incorrect target firm, or 
not succeeding at the post-acquisition integration process. 
 
According to Hitt, Harrison and Ireland (2001) there are different managerial 
implications of transactions related to the acquisitions. For example, an acquired 
business that is unrelated to the acquirer’s core business produces less financial benefit 
because it can produce only financial synergy. Therefore, an acquired business that 
relates to the acquirer’s core business has a higher probability to have a positive 
outcome after merging. To be successful in acquisitions, management needs to consider 
management philosophy and culture. Firms can also learn from diversifying acquisitions. 
The management’s role is to emphasize that new knowledge is created and codified. 
They also highlight that acquisitions include many complex sub-activities that create 
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more challenges to M&As. This means that both technological and non-technological 
acquirers should evaluate how they can exploit the knowledge of the target firm and 
what impact M&As have in the long term run for their strategy.  
 
 
2.3 Definition of research and development expenditure 
When studying technological M&As it is good to define what R&D means. OECD has 
defined the research and development concept as follows: “Research and experimental 
development (R&D) comprises creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order 
to increase the stock of human knowledge and to devise new applications based upon 
it”. This includes basic research, applied research and experimental development 
activities. Basic research acquires new knowledge by experimental or theoretical work. 
Applied research is more specified towards an aim or objective in addition to basic 
research. Experimental development activity is more systematic than applied research. 
It includes drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical 
experience, which is directed to producing new materials, products or devices, to 
installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those 
already produced or installed (OECD 2019).  
 
This study focuses on research and development expenditures in financial statements, 
based on accounting data from the US acquirers. US companies prepare their financial 
statements according to U.S. Generally accepted accounting standards (GAAP). 
According to U.S. GAAP, in the scope of ASC 730 R&D costs are expensed as incurred. 
According to ASC 730 research requires obtaining technical information or new 
knowledge when developing a unique product or process. Development includes 1) 
developing a plan or designing a new product or process or 2) making a significant 
improvement to an existing product or process. Costs related to these activities are 




According to Chan et al (2001) accounting data limits the usefulness of R&D information 
because firms differ regarding what’s included in R&D, and spending of R&D is reported 
as one collective item. It is important to note that R&D expenditures are easily 
manipulated (Hitt et al., 1991) as R&D should be expensed immediately when the costs 
are incurred. According to Chan et al (2001) fields that are R&D intensive usually register 



























3. Research design and data description 
The third chapter provides information on empirical models and variables specification. 
Afterwards the sample and the process of its selection is described. Finally, different 
descriptive statistics are presented.  
 
3.1 Empirical models and data definition 
The chosen empirical approach in this study is multiple linear regression because there 
is more than one independent (X) variable. To test the hypothesizes ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression is used which is one type of linear regression model. OLS 
regression was chosen as the statistical model in this study because it was also used in 
studies by e.g., Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Weitzel and McCarthy (2001) and Hagedoorn 
and Duysters (2002). 
 
The variables chosen for the OLS regression model are in line with the study of Kallunki 
et al. (2009) and Lev & Sougiannis (1996). The first model tests the link between the 
acquirer’s R&D spending and market value. In addition to R&D spending, control 
variables have been added which may influence the stock market value. To test 
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For hypothesis 2 it is tested how firm acquirers can enhance their future profitability 
one year after merger using the following OLS regression model:   
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The data definition used in models 1 and 2 is presented in table 2. 
Table 2. 
Data Definition 
Variable Definition     
RDit Research and development expenditures of the acquirer in year t 
BVit Book value of the acquirer i in year t 
Pit Market Value of the acquirer i in year t 
Eit Net income before research and development expenditures of the acquirer i 
in year t 
Tait Total assets of the acquirer i in year t in millions of dollars 
DEALSit The number of M&As that the acquirer i has conducted during the three 
years prior to the year of the M&A 
CHSit 
 
The number of acquirer i’s shares held by insiders scaled by the number of 
common shares outstanding in year t 
SIZEit Natural logarithm of deal value in year t 
INDk industry-specific indicator variables 
M&Ait 
M&Ait is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm i acquires a technology 
target during year t and zero otherwise 
YEARy YEARy is an indicator variable equal to one in a year y otherwise zero 
 
 
In model 1 vector X represents the control variable. Four control variables are included 
in the model. It is challenging to measure the direct effect of R&D spending on stock 
26 
 
market value and future profitability during the M&A. The first control variable added is 
total assets (TAit), because the size of the acquirer can potentially affect both value 
creation and acquisition performance (Kallunki et al., 2009). According to Ahuja and 
Katila (2001) the larger firm is the more it has resources to exploit from the acquired 
R&D. The acquired R&D covers only a part of the large acquirer’s resources when the 
acquirer may focus on the actual business of innovation. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) 
report that abnormal stock return of the acquirer decreases with the assets of the 
acquirer, or it is more difficult to register abnormal stock return depending on the firm’s 
size. Dang et al. (2018) investigated in their study 100 empirical papers and they found 
that the top three measures of a firm’s size are total assets, total sales and market value. 
They concluded that there is a correlation between these measures and profitability and 
financial performance. Hashmi et al. (2020) concluded that total assets, total sales, and 
market value firm size measures have significant impact on the firm’s performance. For 
large companies results of operations are shown in sales which leads to higher profits 
which also means higher returns on investments and return on equity. As a result, total 
assets have been chosen to measure the acquirer’s size. 
 
The second control variable in the model is the variable DEALSit , i.e. the number of M&As 
conducted by an acquirer during the three years prior to the year of the M&A. Stock 
markets might react positively to the earlier M&A experience of the acquirer and profits 
gained arising from the acquired R&D activities (Fuller et al., 2002). When the acquirers 
has more acquisition experience the better it is in integrating the acquired resources 
into its own business and achieving synergies. (Hitt et al., 2001) consider that firms 
which have recently completed acquisitions have more experience and are more flexible 
to adapt to changes required by the new acquisition. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) found 
that firms have negative abnormal stock returns if they acquire a new technology firm 
during the three years prior to the current acquisition. The market reacts negatively if a 
firm acquires too many technological firms in too short of a time span. This might 




In their original study Kallunki et al. (2009) used the variable Sizeit as a third control 
variable, i.e. the net sales of the target firm divided by the net sales of the acquirer i in 
yeart−1. Since data was not available for target firms this data is replaced by the natural 
logarithm of deal value of the acquirer in the year t. Kohers & Kohers, (2000) explain 
that targets that are large relative to their acquirers can create synergies better than 
small targets in M&A. The deal value doesn’t tell the actual size of the target and might 
be overvalued. This is one challenge for this study as there was a very limited amount of 
data available for the target companies.  
 
Cosh et al. (2006) studied takeovers between 1986–1995 in the UK. According to their 
study there is a strong relation between CEO ownership and both the long-run return 
and operating performance of the acquiring firms. Therefore, the fourth variable is the 
number of acquirer shares held by insiders, scaled by the number of common shares 
outstanding (CHSit). Shares held by insiders include the beneficial ownership of the firm’s 
common stock by all directors and executive officers1. 
 
Chosen years to test hypotheses 1a and 1b are the year when the M&A was completed 
and one year before and after the merger. For these three years data had to be available.  
The four years following the year in which the merger or acquisition was completed has 
been used to test hypothesis 2. The dependent variable is an average of the three-year 
future net income before R&D expenditure scaled by book value of the acquirer during 
the second, third and fourth year after the M&A was completed. 
 
The model 2 tests how acquirers can convert R&D spending into future profitability. 
During the year of the M&A companies might not have had enough time to adjust to the 
reorganization of the newly formed firm, and therefore future profitability is also 
researched. This is also to eliminate the short-term impacts from the acquired company. 
It takes some time for the acquirer to integrate the processes, especially if the 
performance of the target company was poor (Hosono et al., 2009).  
 
1 This data is defined with help of the SEC Form DEF 14A, where insider ownership of the company is mentioned. 
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3.2 Sample design  
The data is collected from the Worldscope and Datastream platforms from the Thomson 
Reuters Eikon database. The data includes only mergers or acquisitions with a deal value 
of at least one million dollars so that the target has some impact on an acquirer 
performance (King et al., 2008). According to Rossi et al. (2013) for technological 
acquisitions it is typical to find new skills and technical and technological knowledge, 
and small and micro-size companies are also involved as target companies. 
Technological mergers and acquisitions have increased since 1990 in high-tech sectors. 
Target companies chosen for this study are mostly privately owned but there are also 
55 publicly listed companies. Acquirers are U.S. firms, but domestic and international 
companies were chosen as targets. This gives this study a very broad scale as the targets 
represent different backgrounds. 
 
Financial industry firms e.g., banks, insurance companies and investment trusts are 
excluded from this study. On the acquirer side, large Nasdaq listed companies were 
chosen. The reason to focus on large companies is that they are more likely to complete 
M&As (Moeller et al., 2004) and large firms have been used in previous studies related 
to M&A (Hitt et al., 1991; Ahuja & Katila 2001). Large companies have more R&D 
spending and knowledge which could be considerable from the financial performance 
point of view. There is more data available for large companies than for smaller 
companies. According to Booth et al. (2006) investor’s pay more attention to large firms 
than small ones.  Studying large companies also include challenges as Cloodt et al. (2006) 
state that especially in large technology companies innovation is harder to implement. 
Moeller et al. (2004) mentioned that large acquirers are likely to overpay for targets. 
This study focuses only on the market valuation and profitability of Nasdaq listed firms 
which have completed a merger or acquisition. Pending, withdrawn, and intended 
acquisitions are not taken into consideration, neither is buyback where companies buy 
their own shares in the market. Firms which have lost tender offers have also been 




The sample M&As are defined as cases where the acquirer owns more than 50 % after 
acquisition and prior to acquisition less than 50 %. When a firm has acquired more than 
half of the shares it got control of the acquired companies after a deal. The study will 
examine how M&As enhance the market value and profitability of the acquirer, not the 
target firm. This sample is divided in two sub-groups (panels) whether a target firm is a 
technology firm or not. The collected data is represented in the following table 3. In case 
there are several companies which fulfill the criteria of data gathering only the largest 
M&As are included in the sample.  
 
Table 3 Distribution of M&As over the sample period shows in numbers how many 
technology acquisitions technology firms have made as regards the column 2 and on 
column 3 non-technology acquisitions. In these M&As acquirers got more than 50 % of 
ownership after the M&A. Acquirers owned prior to acquisition less than 50 % of the 
target firm’s shares. Table 3 shows that it is more common that a technology company 
acquires a technological company, rather than a non-technological company. The total 
number of companies chosen in this sample is 236, of which 96 companies had total 
sales in the year of the M&A of more than 1 billion USD. The sample data consists of 















 Table 3.  
 Distribution of M&As Over the Sample Period  
 
Technology firm 
acquired a technology 
firm 
Non-Technology firm 
acquired a technology 
firm  
Year   All 
1 2 3 4 
2010 
 
20 6 26 
2011 22 7 29 
2012 29 5 34 
2013 17 7 24 
2014 32 4 36 
2015 23 7 30 
2016 24 7 31 
2017 19 7 26 
Total 186 50 236 
 
Technology firms are defined with the help of ThomsonReuters using the macro industry 
of the acquirer and target firm which is high technology. ThomsonReuters macro 
industries are based on standard industrial codes or SIC-codes. Thomson Reuters has 
defined 14 macro industries.  For this study the chosen technology-intensive industries 
are those having one of the following two-digit SIC codes defined by OECD and used for 
the first time by Hall and Vopel (1996). SIC codes and definitions of technology intense 









 Table 4.  
Standard industrial classification codes 
SIC code Definition 
28 Manufacturing: Chemicals and allied products 
35 
Manufacturing: Industrial and commercial machinery and computer 
equipment 
36 
Manufacturing: Electronic and other electrical equipment and 
components (excl. computer equipment) 
37 Manufacturing: Transportation equipment 
38 
Manufacturing: Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling instruments; 
Photographic, medical and optical goods; Watches and clocks 
48 Transportation & public utilities: Communications 
73 Services: Business services 
87 
Services: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and 
related services 
 
Non-technology acquirers represent the following macro industries chosen from 
ThomsonReuters: consumer products and services, energy and power, government and 
agencies, healthcare, industrials, materials, media and entertainment, real estate, retail, 
and telecommunications.  
 
Hitt et al (1991) found that acquisitions don’t always have positive effects on acquirers’ 
R&D expenditures and later R&D outputs. The synergized gains are not immediately 
achieved via acquisitions.  According to synergy theory M&As should have a positive 
effect or no effect on R&D outputs but their results show that innovative outputs 
decrease compared to competitors. Also, Hall (1990) found that R&D intensity generally 
declines after M&As in all industries when she studied 2,500 manufacturing companies. 
Therefor profitability should not be measured immediately after a M&A. According to 
Kallunki et al. (2009) activity of R&D expenditures increases a year after the M&A. That 
is the reason, why in this study future profitability is measured in the next four years 
after the M&A was completed.  
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3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression are presented in table 5. In panel A 
descriptive statistics are presented for technology acquirers and in panel B for non-
technology acquirers.  Assets (millions) of the acquirer indicate that the companies used 
in regression are very big corporations, just as with the number of DEALS. DEALS refer 
to the number of M&As the acquirer conducted during the past three years before the 
relevant M&A. For some companies  
 
Table 5. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
Panel A: Technology Acquirers of Technology Targets      N=186 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
Pit/BVit 5.777 3.127 17.745 -43.905 276.891 
RDit/BVit 0.351 0.165 1.423 -6.650 30.000 
Eit/BVit 0.301 0.254 1.471 -30.077 5.348 
Tait 14,943.195 1,197.320 40,174.368 13.877 290,345.000 
DEALSit 3.532 2.000 4.989 0 35 
CHSit 0.069 0.021 0.145 0.000 0.440 
SIZEit 18.666 18.595 1.849 14.221 24.006 
 
Panel B: Non-Technology Acquirers of Technology Targets   N=50 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
Pit/BVit 3.684 2.477 7.446 0.449 85.839 
RDit/BVit 0.1686 0.092 0.323 0.003 3.446 
Eit/BVit 0.060 0.085 0.114 -0.432 0.462 
Tait 5,418.996 1,188.856 19,490.540 39.071 162,648.00 
DEALSit 2.445 2.000 3.000 0 16 
CHSit 0.080 0.027 0.104 0.000 0.055 




In chapter five in tables 6 and 7 the results of testing model 1 are presented. Table 8 
presents the results for hypothesis 2. To test these models, the OLS regression method 
is used.  A robust test is performed using the statistical Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimation technique, which is also included for hypothesis 1 model 
1, with the Newey-West estimator that is consistent with both the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. GMM was chosen for the robustness test of the 
study because it was also used in the studies of e.g. Bertnand and Zuninga (2004) and 
Kallunki et al. (2009). The results of the robustness test are represented in table 9. In 
addition, this study analyzes if there is any decline in R&D spending and increase in 




















4. Empirical results  
4.1 Results of hypothesis 1 and 2 
(i) Stock Market Valuation of R&D Spending in M&As Involving Technology and 
Non-Technology Acquirers and Technology Targets 
 
This part presents the results for testing model 1. Results for technology acquirers are 
presented in table 6. Results show that there is no correlation between a technology 
company’s acquisition of a technological company and an acquirer’s R&D spending and 
stock market valuation in the short term. Accordingly, hypotheses 1 is rejected. The 
chosen companies were publicly listed, and they may also have several other 
acquisitions during the year the M&A took place. It also might be because the larger the 
company is, the less impact one merger or acquisition has on the results of the whole 
company. Results are reported without control variables in columns 1–3 and with 
control variables in column 4. For each column a separate OLS regression was 
conducted. All variables where one coefficient is MAit are interaction variables, because 
they might be dependent on values of other independent variables. For the hypothesis 
1a nine variables were winsorized because they gave very extreme values (see table 6).  
 
The stock market response to R&D spending in the year of the M&A can be assessed by 
dividing value RDit/BVit × M&Ait by value RDit/BVit in column 4. Values for these variables 
are -20.309 (p-value 0.000) and 7.670 (p-value 0.000). The independent variable p-value 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait was 0.000 which is less than 0.050. It can be shown that stock markets 
react negatively to R&D spending during the year of M&As on a significant level. For big 
companies there is no change to the value creation of R&D for the technology acquirer. 
For the variables Eit/BVit × M&Ait and Eit/BVit the values are -0.180 (p-value 0.831) and 
1.616 (p-value 0.000) respectively in the column 4. Eit/BVit × M&Ait variable is less 
negative which means investors place more value on earnings of the acquirer while for 




One control variable RDit/BVit × M&Ait × CHSit gives a significantly negative value -11.020 
(p-value 0.091). In the previous study there was relative correlation between the 
acquirer’s shares held by insiders and stock market valuation of acquirer’s R&D spending 
in the year of the M&A (Kallunki et al., 2009). It would mean stock markets react 
negatively if shares held by insiders are a large part of the total shares. The less insiders 
own shares the more positively stock markets react to M&As. It is good to consider that 
there might be some changes in construction of ownership and shares, and that shares 
held by insiders might increase or decrease due to a reorganization of ownership. One 
issue troubling investors might be managerial hubris.  
 
Two control variables gave a significantly positive value. The first control variable was 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × SIZEit (deal value) which gave a value of 1.109 (p-value 0.000). This 
finding suggests that the deal value is positively associated with the acquirer’s R&D 
spending and stock market value during the year of the M&A. The deal value most likely 
indicates to the markets how much synergies can be created in technology M&As. The 
deal value includes for example the target’s R&D knowledge, so markets consider that 
the technology acquirer is able to improve its R&D performance via a technology M&A. 
The other control variable RDit/BVit × M&Ait × DEALit (deals conducted in the previous 
three years) gave a value of 0.476 (p-value 0.008) which suggests that the markets react 
positively regarding R&D spending during M&As when the acquirer has completed other 
deals recently as well.  
 
 Other control variables did not show any strong correlation between R&D spending and 
stock market valuation during the year of the M&A.  This study concentrates on what 
kind of outputs acquisitions have on R&D. E.g., Hitt et al. (1991) consider that 
acquisitions have independent effects on R&D as well as broader effects such as 
replacing inefficient managers. Hitt et al. (1991) emphasize the management’s point of 
view in their study. It is justifiably, because management has a vital role in acquisitions 
and how much the firm spends on R&D. For the target firm shareholders M&As create 
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×MAit×Xit+ ∑  φk
7
K=    1 INDk +
∑ 𝜆k
2017
𝑦=2010 YEARy + εit  
     
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 0.481 0.520 0.424 -0.068 
 (0.388) (0.361) (0.451) (0.967) 





Eit/BVit 2.883 2.873 1.817 1.616 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
M&Ait  -0.105 0.256 0.111 
  (0.722) (0.471) (0.758) 
Eit/BVit × M&Ait   1.638 -0.180 
   (0.021)** (0.831) 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait   -3.316 -20.309 
   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
SIZEit    0.032 
    (0.709) 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × SIZEit    1.109 
    (0.000)*** 
TAit    0.000 
    (0.411) 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × TAit    0.000 
    (0.003)*** 
DEALSit    0.116 
    (0.004)*** 
RDit/BVit x M&Ait x DEALSit    0.476 
    (0.008)*** 
CHSit    -0.921 
    (0.295) 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × CHSit    -11.020 
    (0.091)* 
Yearly controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry controls Included Included Included Included 
N 544 544 544 544 
Adj R2 0.585 0.584 0.600 0.675 
P-values are in parentheses. 0.000 denotes a p-value of less than 0.0005. N is the number of observations used in 








Results for non-technology acquirers are presented in table 7. When the acquirer is a 
non-technology firm it seems that the results are different compared to technological 
firms. Variable RDit/BVit × M&Ait has a positive value of 15.970 in column 4, but not on a 
significant level (p-value > 0.050). Value Eit/BVit × M&Ait is a negative value but also not 
on a significant level. 
 
It is interesting to conclude that for non-technology acquirers there is positive 
correlation between shares held by insiders and R&D spending for stock markets, as 
seen in table 7 column 4. The value of RDit/BVit x M&Ait x CHSit 9.660 is not negative as 
in table 6. The p-value is 0.593 which means markets react positively but not on a 
significant level (p-value > 0.050). This indicates that markets believe that management 
is taking risks by acquiring something new for the company. The control variables 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × SIZEit and RDit/BVit × M&Ait ×DEALSit are both negative values and 
their p-value is more than 0.050. This might indicate that a big deal value from acquirer’s 
side and previous M&As completed in recent history have negative effect on stock 
market valuation. As a conclusion there is no strong between control variables used in 
this study and stock market valuation of acquirer’s R&D spending in the year of the M&A 















 P-values are in parentheses. 0.000 denotes a p-value of less than 0.0005. N is the number of observations used in 





Stock Market Valuation of R&D Spending in M&As Involving Non-Technology 
Acquirers and Technology Targets 
 
























𝑦=2010 YEARy + εit   
  1 2 3 4 
Intercept -1.182 -1.198 0.139 -2.411 
 (0.165) (0.170) (0.863) (0.300) 
RDit/BVit 20.036 20.029 12.521 5.491 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Eit/BVit 12.389 12.397 7.928 2.844 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.158) 
M&Ait  0.046 -1.822 0.431 
  (0.926) (0.001)*** (0.467) 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait   9.330 15.970 
   (0.000)*** (0.395) 
Eit/BVit × M&Ait   6.028 -1.121 
   (0.120) (0.747) 
SIZEit    0.186 
    (0.000)*** 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait ×   SIZEit    -1.141 
    (0.259) 
TAit    0.000 
    (0.000)*** 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait × TAit    0.000 
    (0.019)** 
DEALSit    0.208 
    (0.009)*** 
RDit/BVit × M&Ait ×DEALSit    -0.443 
    (0.406) 
CHSit    -0.566 
    (0.755) 
RDit/BVit x M&Ait x CHSit    9.660 
    (0.593) 
Yearly controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry controls Included Included Included Included 
N 150 150 150 150 
Adj R2 0.450 0.50 0.884 0.943 
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b) R&D Spending and Future Financial Performance of the Acquirer 
 
For hypotheses 2a and 2b the effects of the M&A on the future profitability of the 
acquirer were examined. The chosen years were the next four years after the year in 
which the acquisition or merger was completed. The first year is one year(it+1) after the 
M&A was completed which is also the last year tested in model 1. For technology 
acquires column 1 in table 8 shows that one year after the merger or acquisition is 
completed the company cannot yet convert R&D spending into future profitability. In 
the long-term technological M&As are profitable for the technology acquirer and after 
one year the technology acquirer has been more efficient in implementing the M&A. 
The dependent variable is based on the three-year average of net income before 
research and development expenditures scaled by book value from second to fourth 
year after the M&A was completed.  
 
Non-technology acquirers’ future profitability is more unsure. In column 2 the results 
show that the M&A is profitable after the second and third year when the M&A was 
completed but then there is a sudden decline. Compared to non-technology acquirers, 
non-technological companies are not that efficient in converting R&D spending into 
future profitability. As a result, when the acquirer is a non-technology firm it seems that 
they do not get the full potential of the M&A.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 shows that the M&A does not have a short-term effect on firm’s stock 
market valuation. For this study very large companies were chosen. Regarding M&As, it 









P-values are in parentheses. 0.000 denotes a p-value of less than 0.0005. N is the number of observations used in 











Effect of Current R&D Spending on the Future Profitability of the Technology 
and Non-Technology Acquirers of Technology Targets 






































 Technology Acquirers of 
Technology Targets 
 Non-Technology Acquirers of 
Technology Targets 
 





   
Varible 1  2  
Intercept 0.082  0.037  
       (0.000)***  (0.413)  
Eit/BVit+1 0,246  1.212  
        (0.000)***         (0.000)*** 
) 
 
RDit/BVit+1 -0.017  -2.220  
 (0.791)          (0.000)***  
RDit+2/BVit+2 0.154  3.316  
    (0.072)*         (0.000)***  
RDit+3/BVit+3 0.171  1.273  
      (0.012)**          (0.007)***  
RDit+4/BVit+4 0.492  -2.745  
        (0.000)***          (0.000)*** 
 
 
     
N 143  38  
Adj R2 0,834  0,988  
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4.2 Robustness test 
a) GMM Estimation technique 
 
In table 9 a robustness check is performed using the Generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation to test hypotheses 1a and 1b using the model 1 as in tables 6 and 7. 
The same extreme variables of technology acquirers are excluded from this test. Results 
are similar to that of the OLS regression model 1, and they support these findings. Stock 
markets react negatively to R&D spending of the technology acquirer in the year of 
M&A. For the non-technology acquirers values RDit/BVit × M&Ait and Eit/BVit × M&Ait are 
negative but not on significant level. 
 
As a result, there is no correlation between annual stock market return and R&D 
spending during the M&A. Results are not presented in any table but are available upon 
request.  In conclusion there might be a short peak to share prices during the acquisition, 
but one acquisition does not affect the share prices on an annual basis. 
 
Managers can substitute R&D investments with acquisitions and that might lead to the 
acquirer not fully exploiting acquired technology or the technology being outdated. In 
the long-term acquisitions reduce innovativeness of the acquired firm. Acquisitions may 
have a stronger impact on R&D investments than on diversification, but diversifying 
acquisitions have a strong impact on R&D outputs. M&As have various effects on R&D 
inputs and outputs and also increase diversification. As a result, Hitt et al. (1991) suggest 
that diversifying M&As and a sudden reduction in patents due to diversifying M&As may 










Results from using GMM Estimation Technique 
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Colum 1  2  
Intercept 0.163  3.238  
 (0.912)  (0.398)  
RDit/BVit 7.527  1.450  
        (0.000)***  (0.544)  
Eit/BVit 1.762  3.639  
               (0.137)       (0.026)**  
M&Ait 0.069  0.101  
 (0.900)  (0.800)  
Eit/BVit × M&Ait -0.289  -1.030  
  (0.876)  (0.741)  
RDit/BVit × M&Ait -20.430  -2.255  
 
      (0.012)**  (0.559)  
Control variables Included  Included  
N 544  150  
Adj R2 0.668  0.402  
P-values are in parentheses. 0.000 denotes a p-value of less than 0.0005. N is the number of 













b) Changes in R&D Spending and Earnings in the Year of the M&A 
 
Kallunki et al. (2009) broadened their study and investigated whether the acquirer’s R&D 
spending decreased, and profitability increased during the year of the M&A. The 
assumption is that technology acquirers can re-invest their R&D spending more 
efficiently than non-technology acquirers. In line with Kallunki et al. (2009) the OLS 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦
2010
𝑦=2017




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦
2010
𝑦=2017
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (4) 
 
Table 10 shows what happens to the acquirer’s R&D spending and financial performance 
during the year when the M&A is completed.  The years chosen for the model are the 
same as in model 1, i.e., one year before the M&A, the year of the M&A and one year 
after the M&A. The analysis period (2010–2017) is the same as in model 1. For both 
technological and non-technology acquirers R&D spending does not decrease.  That 
means companies do not cut their R&D spending in the year of the M&A. This might also 
be applicable to other kinds of spending on the part of the acquirer. At the same time 
for technology acquirers there is decrease of earnings during the year of M&A. The 
results are consistent with the results reported in table 6 that stock market valuation of 
the R&D and earnings do not increase during the M&A for technology acquirers.  For 
this study very large companies were chosen that also acquired other companies during 
the same year or before, which might explain the increased R&D spending during the 
year when the M&A was completed. In this case it is not possible to say whether the 
increased spending was intentional or not. On the other hand, it might be also good for 






Impact of the M&A on Acquirer’s Earnings and R&D Expenditures 
Panel A: Technology Acquirers of Technology Targets 
 
  Eit/BVit  RDit/BVit     
Intercept  0.571  0.299     
  (0.004)***  (0.113)     
M&Ait  -0.231  0.176     
  (0.081)*  (0.167)     
N   558  558     
Adj R2  0.002  0.004     
         
Panel B: Non-Technology Acquirers of Technology Targets 
 
  Eit/BVit  RDit/BVit   
Intercept  0.079  0.051  
  (0.306)  (0.058)  
M&Ait  0.054  -0.006  
  (0.327)  (0.771)  
N   150  150  
Adj R2  0.040  0.054  
P-values are in parentheses. 0.000 denotes a p-value of less than 0.0005. N is the number of 














5. Summary and conclusions 
This study investigated how R&D spending of the acquirer increased a firm’s market 
value and future profitability during M&As. The observation period was the seventh 
merger wave between 2010 and 2017. Two main hypotheses were tested: Can 
technological and non-technological acquirers enhance their market value, and in turn 
their future profitability, by completing technological M&As? The first hypothesis tested 
if R&D spending can enhance the acquirer’s stock market value in the short term if a 
M&A is completed. In the short term there is no statistically significant correlation 
between R&D spending and the acquirer’s current market value, regardless of if the 
acquirer is a technological or non-technological firm. At the same time some studies 
have proven that when a technological company acquires a technological company 
there is a strong correlation between R&D spending and market value and profitability 
during M&As (e.g., Ahuja & Katila 2001; Higgins & Rodriguez 2006; Hitt et al., 1991; 
Kallunki et al., 2009). 
 
Secondly the study looked at the correlation between R&D spending and a firm’s 
profitability in the long term. In conclusion, there seems to be an impact in the long term 
on the firm’s profitability when the acquirer is a technological company (hypothesis 2).  
Technological acquirers are better at converting R&D spending in the long term than 
non-technological acquirers. This is in line with previous studies. In conclusion it can be 
suggested that for large companies it takes more time to convert and implement their 
R&D spending into future profitability after a M&A. Even R&D are counted as 
expenditures, they have a long-term impact on a firm’s result. Failed investments in R&D 
might lead to an end of the business or part of the business. Management of the 
acquirers need to evaluate carefully how they can integrate the target company into 
their operations. R&D spending of the acquirer can be considered valuable information 
for investors. 
 
For both technological and non-technological firms organizational and strategic fit is 
very important part in succeeding in M&A when the target is technological. Non-
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technological acquires don’t seem to have long term strategy how to implement R&D 
knowledge to profitability while technological acquirers have more clear plan for that. 
Ahuja and Katila (2001) mentioned that large firms can benefit from the technological 
M&As because they have more resources to integrate the acquired R&D into their own 
business and create new innovations. At the same time acquired R&D covers only part 
of the large firms’ businesses which means the acquirer can cope with the failed M&S 
better than a small company. In a long term more synergies are created when two 
technological companies merge than when the acquirer is a non-technological company.  
 
The relationship between how reliable and economically relevant information on R&D 
spending is compared to future revenue has generally not been proven directly (Lev & 
Sougiannis, 1996). Also, Chan, et al. (2001) did not find a direct link between R&D 
spending and stock market value but agreed that R&D intensity is associated with return 
volatility. There are still factors beyond this study’s scope that needs to be taken into 
consideration because there are many motives behind acquisitions, and there are also 
many factors that affect a large company’s stock market valuation and profitability.  
 
Generally, all M&As are individual and some M&As thrive and some fail. M&As are a 
very popular strategy but they are also rather risky at the same time. Costs of M&As are 
usually very high. Capital is easily available and M&As are a tempting solution to try and 
make a business profitable. Fast decisions lead to poor quality of thinking, preparation, 
and post-merger management. The reasons behind failing might be due to M&As not 
supporting the acquirer’s strategy. The management might also find M&A processes 
exciting and might prefer to make new deals rather than starting post-merger processes 
(Bower, 2001). This seems to happen especially when non-technology acquirers acquire 
technological companies. Technological acquisitions may not support the non-
technology acquirer’s strategy enough in the long term. Failures in M&As might also be 
due to managerial hubris or that the management is driven by maximizing their own 
interest rather than the company’s value. According to Cordeiro (2014) we still know 
very little about the history of M&As and errors that have occurred in the past are likely 
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to be repeated in the future. Technology M&As provide both great growth opportunities 
and high risk of failure for the acquirer.  
 
There are certain limitations regarding this study. Due to a small sample size all results 
cannot be generalized to all technological mergers and acquisitions, especially not to all 
sizes of companies or all countries. A qualitative approach was taken in observing M&As 
and all integration mechanisms on how other functions such as marketing, employees 
and production affected how successful the M&A was, were not part of this study.  It is 
very challenging to prove how much stock market value is affected by the R&D spending 
of the acquirer. 
 
M&As are very tempting for companies from a strategic point of view, and the money 
involved is astronomical. Technology companies play a very important role in M&As and 
the technology industry is still a growing business. This study focused on large 
companies which play an important role in acquiring technological targets of varying 
sizes. Also, the seventh merger wave starting from 2010 gives new information on 
M&As. The M&As studied here occurred during the seventh wave of M&As, which is a 
period that still hasn’t been fully researched. Rossi et al. (2013) studied during their 
literature review companies and how successful they were at M&As. They found that 
results have generally been negative due to the complexity of the M&A process where 
managers have a lot of responsibility for planning and implementing the M&A. Especially 
in technological M&As these sectors are characterized by a high level of growth in 
technology and high uncertainty, which can result in various outcomes for stakeholders.  
 
M&As offer several topics to study and there is still a lot to learn from them. The 
manager’s part in succeeding with the M&A cannot be ignored either. The value 
decreasing theories relate mostly to managers. Their planning and implementing also 
play an important role in M&As. It is also likely that M&As in technology driven industries 
will continue to be part of normal business which will give new topics to study in the 
future, to understand more profoundly the future effects of M&As. It would be an The 
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different factors affecting the stock market valuation and profitability would also be an 
interesting topic to study more in dept in the future. For example, do investors pay 
attention to R&D expenses and return on research capital (RORC) ratio when looking at 
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